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Abstract 
Anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) are the only medications capable of extending the 
lives of those with AIDS. How they are distributed is, therefore, an important 
concern for both normative and positive reasons. The paper tests various 
potential theories about the distribution of scarce resources and provision of 
public goods from political science and economics against new data on the 
distribution of ARVs under the South African national rollout plan. Strong 
evidence is found in support of theories that predict that voter interests and 
knowledge drive the distribution of resources in democracies. 
Introduction 
Anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs), the “AIDS cocktail drugs”, are scarce and 
expensive goods in many African countries.  They are the sole medications 
capable of extending survival for those afflicted with AIDS, slowing the spread 
of the disease by making afflicted individuals less infectious.2 Although the 
drugs are primarily intended for individuals with low white-blood cell counts 
rather than all current AIDS patients, most of those who have AIDS will 
eventually need to be placed on the drugs unless a cure is developed. Like any 
scarce resource, however, important distributional issues arise in the provision 
of ARVs, particularly in poor and middle-income African countries in which 
they are scarce and costly goods.  Given the life and death stakes that surround 
the distribution of these pharmaceuticals, it is important that political scientists 
understand how they are delivered in low- and middle-income settings. 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Yuen Yuen Ang, Dan Butler, Dara Cohen, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, 
Bethany Lacina, David Laitin, Robert Mattes, Nicoli Nattrass, Jed Stiglitz, Jessica Weeks and 
Jeremy Weinstein for helpful comments and support. I would also like to thank the Center for 
Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town for material support during the 
writing of this paper. 
2 See the Harvard Consensus Statement on Anti-Retroviral Treatment of AIDS in Poor 
Countries (2001). 
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The provincial “rollout” of ARVs in South Africa, which has a national 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of around 15-20%, provides an intriguing case for 
the study of distributional politics and health goods. The South African rollout 
was announced by the national government in 2003, shortly before national 
elections, and officially begun in mid-2004. While the South African ARV 
rollout is in large part an initiative of the national government, there is in fact 
considerable variation among South African provinces and districts in the 
distribution of these drugs. Furthermore, this variation is not well explained by 
purely technical considerations such as the administrative capacity to administer 
drugs.  On the one hand, the province of Western Cape, with strong health 
services and large per capita GDP, is among the best equipped to distribute 
ARVs; accordingly, it established a provincial ARV rollout programme almost 
3 years ahead of the other provinces.  But if infrastructure is the main 
determinant of response, then why did Gauteng, a province with comparable 
resources but a substantially higher rate of infections, not develop a similar 
programme? 
There are strong normative reasons for asking what predicts the distribution of 
ARVs. Daniels (2004) argues that the distribution of such drugs in poor settings 
should be set by a process of fair selection rather than political expediency.  
Disturbingly, AIDS prevalence rates do not satisfactorily explain variation in 
the ARV rollout. Western Cape has the lowest rate of infection relative to other 
provinces in South Africa, and yet it has the highest per capita spending on 
health. Northern Cape, which has the second lowest prevalence rate, is the 
second highest spender on health per capita. On the other hand, Mpumalanga 
which has a rate of infection much higher than Northern Cape spends just over 
half as much on health per capita. To examine the source of these statements see 
Table 1. These examples serve to illustrate the considerable differences in the 
allocation of ARVs across South Africa.  
How are these scarce and crucial resources distributed?  This is an important 
question for research in political economy both from positive and normative 
points of view. Understanding how governments dole out goods sheds light on 
the circumstances under which governments respond to citizen preferences. 
Normatively, there may be distributional arrangements that are superior to 
others in terms of efficiency and social justice. Furthermore, in studying the 
case of ARVs in South Africa we can learn more about the political economy of 
public health goods and the incentives governments face in delivering goods 





Table 1: Rollout Figures for the Provinces 








































EC May 2004  9.5% 14.2% 17 108 R12,185 R873 21.8% 
FS May 2004  13.7% 6.0% 32 143 R21,437 R1,193 21.0% 
GT April 2004  14.3% 20.1% 42 105 R36,913 R1,179 29.6% 
KZN April 2004  15.6% 20.7% 27 107 R18,528 R1,017 20.0% 
LP Aug 2004  6.7% 12.0% 14 111 R12,040 R829 27.3% 
MP Aug 2004  13.3% 7.0% 19 93 R20,499 R774 20.9% 
NC July 2004  6.5% 1.9% 38 141 R24,922 R1,238 32.3% 
NW June 2004  12.5% 8.0% 13 90 R17,198 R767 24.5% 
WC May 2001  5.0% 10.3% 55 106 R30,628 R1,433 55.7% 
Total  11.0% 100% 28 109 R22,569 R1,014 25.2% 
The paper will proceed as follows. In the first section I review the literature on 
public goods, since we might regard ARVs as a special type of public goods, 
and develop several broad hypotheses about how scarce goods such as ARVs 
may be distributed. In this review, I develop the theories and evidence 
marshaled by other researchers on the topics of how and why governments 
distribute services and goods to their populaces. In the second section, I discuss 
the history of HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa. In the third, I present the data 
and statistical methods used to test my hypotheses. The fourth section uses both 
the statistical analysis and qualitative record to develop an explanation of 
variation in the distribution ARVs. I conclude with suggestions for further 
research on this topic and what the findings imply for South Africa’s AIDS 
crisis. 
ARVs and the Literature on Public Goods 
ARVs are only widely available to patients in the developed world and some 
middle-income countries.3 There are several reasons for this gap. First, the 
medications themselves are costly even though prices have decreased in recent 
years and must be taken continuously for a patient’s entire life. A lapse in 
treatment can lead to a resurgence of symptoms in the patient, potentially 
resulting in a drug resistant strain, making continuous treatment both 
individually and collectively desirable.  
                                                 
3 See Nattrass (2006) for more on these gaps in distribution. 
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Second, while the infrastructure and services required to administer these drugs 
is less than the technical apparatus needed for the effective treatment of other 
chronic diseases such as cancer, it is still considerable. A potential candidate for 
these drugs must be tested for HIV/AIDS, receive a white blood cell count test, 
consult with a physician for toxic side-effects and to learn about the dietary and 
lifestyle restrictions that come with the drugs, be placed on a schedule for 
ingestion, pick up their prescription and return repeatedly for regular visits to 
the clinic or hospital to check for negative side effects. While there is little in 
the way of costly machinery or infrastructure required to provide these services, 
they require considerable bureaucratic and human services capacity. 
Third, ARVs are not necessarily the highest priority for either governments or 
even citizens in the developing world given the wide range of other problems 
that affect their populations. Crime, other diseases, education, infrastructural 
investments and a host of other important concerns may crowd out HIV/AIDS 
and its treatment as major concerns depending on factors such as the national 
prevalence rate, which populations tend to be infected and what feasible policy 
options are available. Even though the risks posed by the pandemic are 
considerable, we should not simply expect governments to the make 
controversial, costly and difficult policies to deal with HIV/AIDS their first 
priority. Citizens may also further inaction because they are not aware of the 
various policy options, the potential costs of inaction, or because they have 
demands other than aggressive HIV/AIDS policies. 
These three conditions make ARVs both costly and scarce even in a middle-
income country such as South Africa, where the need for them is very great. 
Furthermore, ARVs function in a manner similar to other public goods. While 
most South Africans do not need to take ARVs, low- and middle-income 
citizens strongly prefer that the government provide them, both because of the 
beneficial social effects and because they themselves may one day need to 
enroll as patients in the rollout. It is useful, therefore, to consider how other 
work has attempted to study the political determinants of the distribution of 
public goods. 
There is a broad literature on the distribution of public goods in democratic 
settings, spanning political science and economics, much of it focusing on the 
reelection incentives of politicians. A common theme is that politicians use 
public goods to “reward” votes with regionally-specific and costly public works 
projects.4 Cox and McCubbins (1986), for example, argue that core supporters 
                                                 
4 Much has been done on this in the American politics literature. Ferejohn (1974), for 
example, has examined the distribution of Army Corps of Engineers projects, finding that 
such projects are more often awarded to districts with greater congressional influence 
regardless of their objective benefits. In similar work, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) have 
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are a more reliable and cheaper source of support than swing voters or core 
opposition supporters. Incumbent politicians use public spending to ensure that 
these voters return to the polls to maintain them in power. Others have 
contended that politicians tend to deliver goods to those groups who can tilt 
election outcomes. Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987) argue that politicians seek to influence the voting behavior of key 
groups. Their probabilistic models are extensions of the Median Voter Theorem, 
which predicts that politicians will seek to cater to the demands of that voter 
who plays a central role in determining the outcome of an election. 
These findings are often couched in terms of single member plurality (SMP) 
voting systems that cannot always be generalised to proportional representation 
(PR) voting systems such as South Africa’s, in which politicians are elected 
through lists and may face different incentives for reelection. Lizzeri and 
Persico (2001) model the provision of public goods under SMP and PR systems, 
concluding that PR systems are more likely to deliver geographically broader 
public goods because candidates are accountable to geographically (and perhaps 
demographically) broader shares of the population. Stratmann and Baur (2001) 
examine these theoretical intuitions with evidence from Germany, which has a 
mixed PR and SMP system. They find that those legislators under the SMP 
system prefer geographically-centered projects for pork, while PR legislators 
tended towards broader forms of public goods and works. 
Further work on vote buying has suggested that politicians can exchange 
individually directed goods and services (ranging from cash payments to the 
handout of clothing and food) for the support of constituents. For example, 
Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) find that in Argentina, vote buying is an 
effective strategy in poor districts where politicians can effectively monitor and 
punish voters who promise support but do not deliver it after receiving goods. 
The goods delivered by such politicians tend to be smaller and tailored to the 
individual, making them more effective at securing the votes of individual 
voters. An interesting implication is that those lower-income voters who 
received goods from politicians tended to then feel obliged to support those 
same politicians because they can be monitored and punished. 
Not all goods can be delivered individually and voters may be difficult to 
monitor. In an analysis of spending programmes in both Mexico and the United 
States, Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Estevez (2003) find that incumbents’ 
tendency to view reelection chances probabilistically affects the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                        
examined the bases of the incumbent advantage in both the American and British contexts, 
finding that citizens expect considerable personal and ombudsman-like services from their 
representatives in exchange for their support (though the effect is somewhat muted in the 
party-driven British system) 
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goods. Core supporters are valued because they can be relied upon to turn out 
and vote. On the other hand, when incumbents face considerable reelection 
risks, they may decide to offer goods to “riskier” swing voters in order to secure 
those crucial extra votes. This mechanism sheds light on why politicians 
sometimes attempt to woo swing groups and at other times mobilise their base 
and enhances the previous work of Cox and McCubbins (1986). 
Another set of work assesses the importance of non-materialist considerations 
such as ideological and ethnic ties in the distribution of public goods. Avinash 
and Londregan (1995, 1996, 1998) examine the question of why swing voters 
may receive more goods than other groups with a focus on ideology. They 
contend that voters must trade off distributive and ideological (that is, non-
distributive and non-materialist) political demands. Their explanation is that 
politicians will stake out ideological positions to entice voters who will be 
swayed by such considerations, but compete on economic policy for more 
ideologically moderate swing voters. Kasara (2005) offers a complimentary 
empirical account in the African context, in which some ethnic groups are tied 
to a particular set of politicians who ostensibly represent their interests. These 
politicians tend to tax swing groups less than their own constituencies because 
their core supporters are highly unlikely to vote for other candidates (principally 
because of strong views on non-distributive political issues). Survey evidence of 
high levels of black identification with the ANC indicates that a similar effect 
may be occurring in South Africa, because the ANC receives considerable 
support because of its role in resisting and dismantling apartheid.5 
A related literature looks at the impact of ethnic diversity on public goods 
provision, with much of this work building off of a seminal paper by Easterly 
and Levine (1997), who find that ethnically diverse countries experience 
economically worse outcomes. While this work is cross-national, further 
inquiries have studied single cases. Work by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) 
and Alesina and Ferrara (2004) has examined the role of ethnicity in the 
securing public goods in American communities. Their work is novel in that it 
proposes that different ethnic groups may have varying “tastes” over which 
goods they prefer. That is to say, different groups may have different 
preferences over various goods, making collective action more difficult. In 
contrast, work by Miguel and Gugerty (2004) has alternately hypothesised that 
the social sanctioning necessary to secure collective action is less viable in 
ethnically diverse communities.  
In sum, the literature on public goods offers a variety of explanations for 
variation in public goods provision.  Central insights are that politicians use 
public goods provision strategically, doling out goods in ways that maximise 
                                                 
5 See Letsoholo (2005). 
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their chances of reelection, groups may vary in their preferences over goods, 
and the importance of the (in)capacity of voters to organise to secure public 
goods.  
Most ARVs in the African context are provided by NGOs, development 
agencies or other non-state actors. Most states in the region often cannot afford 
or organise to provide ARVs and have become dependent on external actors for 
assistance in dealing with their epidemics. Unfortunately the range of actors 
providing these goods and services at varying levels of engagement across 
different geographic zones makes gathering reliable data very difficult.  
These data issues have made Botswana and South Africa useful cases, because 
of the scope of their epidemics and the availability of data on prevalence, the 
distribution of drugs and other variables of interest. In both these cases, there is 
still considerable work being done by NGOs and other agencies, but the 
governments of both countries have the financial and infrastructural capacities 
to engage in large-scale preventative and treatment efforts. At this time, both 
countries have nation-wide, but uneven, ARV distribution plans in which 
citizens not covered by private-sector plans can apply to receive drugs free of 
charge from the government. South Africa, with greater variation in prevalence 
rates, infrastructure and support for the ruling party, makes an excellent case for 
analysing how a government distributes these costly and service-heavy 
resources. As I mentioned above, there is considerable variation across and 
within provinces in how these drugs are distributed. The rates of distribution in 
districts will be the dependent variable of interest in this paper since it reflects 
the distributional agenda and capacity of the South African government. 
In studying South Africa, four important considerations apply. The first is that 
the ANC is a hegemonic party that tends to win most seats across the country by 
moderate to large margins. There are no districts in which the ANC is neither 
currently nor potentially competitive. I assume that there are only either “safe” 
or “competitive” regions for the ANC; no “lost” ones, which cannot be won 
without the proper investment in securing votes.  
The second is that since the 2004 elections in South Africa were held under a 
proportional representation (PR) system in which both provincial and national 
level lists were voted upon, the relative number of both voters and AIDS 
patients in each district matters for testing distributional theories. For any 
analysis to be accurate, it must account for difference of magnitude as well as 
proportion. Small districts with high AIDS rates may well require fewer drugs 
than very large districts with smaller AIDS rates. 
Third, though the rollout has been ongoing for over two years, district-level data 
is only available for the first 6 months of the programme. October 2004, the 
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fourth month, is the last month with full data for all districts. As data is released, 
I hope to incorporate it into my analysis. This means that whatever conclusions 
I advance apply only to the initial stages of the programme. This does not affect 
the conclusions of the paper and provides an opportunity to gauge which 
districts have been prioritised by the ANC-government in this rollout. 
Lastly, the distribution of ARVs is a post-election phenomenon, since the plan 
was announced prior to the election, but only implemented subsequently. This 
implies that the ANC is not under immediate electoral pressure to distribute 
these goods. Rather, the ANC, having promised an effective rollout plan, is now 
in the position of delivering (or not) on that promise. This raises the issue of a 
commitment problem between the ANC and its supporters, which will be 
explored empirically in later sections of this paper. 
Competing Theories of ARV Distribution 
What explains variation in which districts distribute more ARVs? One theory, 
which might be considered something of a non-political explanation, is that 
there are differences in the health capacities of districts across the country. 
These infrastructural limitations lead to an inability on the part of the 
government to deliver the drugs to patients in worse-off districts. Such an 
explanation assumes that there is genuine determination on the part of the 
government to distribute the medication, with variation in success coming not as 
part of a larger strategic interaction between voters and government, but as a 
constraint on what can be done with the given resources. In some senses, this 
theory can be considered a “null hypothesis” because infrastructure will have to 
be controlled for to make any analysis valid. If other explanations do not 
account for the variation, then it is very likely that it is infrastructure that it 
leading to differences across regions.  
Other explanations can look to strategic political behavior by the ANC. While 
some of the variation can no doubt be accounted for by infrastructure, political 
elements also seem important. Spending and allocation decisions are indeed 
influenced by considerations of need and capacity, but they are also affected by 
political considerations as the public goods literature has demonstrated.  
One potential strategic explanation deals with “demand” side of distribution. 
Voters, even those with AIDS, have a wide range of additional concerns other 
than the epidemic, including crime, employment, poverty reduction, education, 
sanitation and so on. Voters may rank other concerns above AIDS and lead 
politicians to prioritise the goods that they deliver given that their budget 
constraints. Consider the following illustration: In a given district there may be 
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20% of potential voters who list AIDS as a primary concern with crime and 
education as secondary concerns. If the remaining 80% divide their support for 
crime and education as their primary concerns, then the government will have a 
strong interest in funding more crime prevention and educational programmes 
than AIDS programmes. Thus, even though AIDS may be an important concern, 
it is not the sole problem faced by South African voters and this may lead to 
variation among voters on the basis of demand for the drugs. 
The above explanation deals with ARVs as a form of pork. That is, ARVs are 
given to voters who desire them in exchange for electoral support in upcoming 
elections. The general idea behind such strategic action is as follows: Politicians 
face the pressures of reelection and thus seek to acquire sufficient votes to be 
reelected; often seeking comfortable majorities since there are informational 
issues that come from not knowing how much support one really has. In order 
to secure these needed votes, politicians cater to the demands of voters, 
authorising projects that provide voters with the public goods they desire. In 
essence, politicians purchase political support from voters by giving them the 
goods and services they demand. In the case of HIV/AIDS, we should expect 
communities that benefit from such pork-barrel politics to receive more drugs if 
they have a higher demand for them, controlling for the number of AIDS 
patients and delivery infrastructure in a given community.6 
An alternative explanation may rest on the “supply” side in which it is not 
specifically voter demands that leads to the observed distribution pattern but a 
strategic decision on the part of the government. Under this hypothesis, those 
districts in which the ruling party has solid support are rewarded with more 
ARVs for that support regardless of the demand or numbers of AIDS-infected 
persons. As the literature review above has shown, there is no predominant or 
widely accepted theory as to why core supporters may be valued above other 
types of voters. One plausible explanation, following Diaz-Cayeros et al., is that 
core supporters are more reliable for turning out to vote than other types of 
voters after they have received their goods. Brusco et al. have noted that the 
provision of public goods by politicians is something of a peculiar principal-
agent problem in which the politician is relying on voters to engage in costly 
voting after he or she has provided them with a beneficial policy. Core 
supporters may be more reliable either because they are easier to monitor or 
because they are known to have strong intrinsic preferences for the party, as in 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that politicians can be strategic in their allocation of projects. Some 
communities may desire funds for new police stations while others may want better roads, 
leading to the provision of different goods on the basis of different demands. Additionally, 
the purchasing of votes in some communities may come at too high a price, since voters 
intrinsically prefer an opposition party, regardless of policy platforms. In the South African 
case, there are no districts in which such a demographic seems to exist. 
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the Dixit and Langregan model and the Kasara work, making voting a less 
costly activity for them. Either way, the key element in this theoretical approach 
is that politicians see core-supporters as a surer bet for reelection votes than 
other types, and so go to reward them. An alternative theoretical approach might 
be one of cost-benefit analysis on the part of politicians. Public goods are costly 
and difficult to provide, and so politicians seek to provide the minimum number 
of such goods to win. Since core-voters are assumed to “cost less” since they 
have some non-material attachment to the party, they are simply cheaper voters 
to buy votes from.  
I cannot, unfortunately, distinguish among these various supply-side 
explanations with my data. It should be noted, though, that the case I examine is 
immediately post-election, meaning that the next national election is off in the 
relatively distant future. At this time, the ANC was freer to pursue goals other 
than reelection for the time period of the data. Since electoral pressures 
underpin the “demand” theories described above, why should supply theories 
matter in this analysis? The ANC’s largest core constituency, black South 
Africans, is much more likely to be afflicted with disease, while also being less 
likely to have the economic means to independently secure treatments.7 We 
might expect ANC politicians to have a normative interest in favoring their 
constituents, given the magnitude of the disease. More importantly prior to the 
election the ANC announced the rollout in the face of and emphasised that it 
would be driven by a concern for those South Africans most afflicted by the 
disease.8 In essence, the government promised to deliver an effective 
programme, and presumably implicitly directed much of that promise to their 
constituency given that core constituencies matter enormously in PR systems. If 
such a promise was kept then we should see higher numbers of ARVs going to 
districts with greater ANC vote share, controlling for level of infrastructural 
factors. 
I summarise the hypotheses generated by supply, demand and infrastructural 
theories below: 
 H1: “Null” Hypothesis: Greater infrastructural capacity variables correlate 
positively and significantly with greater ARV distribution at the district level, 
controlling for need. No other considerations are significant. 
 H2: Demand Hypothesis: Variables that measure demand for ARVs correlate 
with greater ARV distribution at the district level, controlling for need and 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
7 See the Nelson Mandela/HSRC Study of HIV/AIDS (2002) 
8 See Graph 1 for comparisons of public opinion about HIV/AIDS and government 
performance across South African ethnic groups. 
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 H3: Supply Hypothesis: Variables that measure ARV core support correlate with 
greater ARV distribution at the district level, controlling for need and 
infrastructure. 
It may also be possible that the government is both rewarding its supporters and 
chasing after new voters with the rollout plan, making both H2 and H3 possible 
simultaneously. This seems unlikely given the ANC’s reluctance to implement 
treatment in the first place. Furthermore, the costs of such a programme would 
be very high, potentially threatening the financing of other popular programmes. 
Since the analysis focuses on the earliest stages of the rollout, it is likely to 
reflect those areas that the ANC has prioritised. If there is strong evidence for 
both types of theories, however, they can be effectively distinguished between 
by examining how much of the variation in distribution demand and vote share 
each manages to explain vis-à-vis the other. 
It is important to note that the strategic theories both assume that the 
government can somehow limit the amount of citizens placed on ARVs. It could 
be argued that such an assumption is unwarranted given that if a patient 
qualifies for the drugs, a clinic will likely enroll them. The situation, though, is 
more complicated than one of simply demanding and receiving the drugs. In 
many cases, clinics are chronically understaffed making waiting lists and the 
times between appointments long. One TAC organiser reported in an interview 
that it was not uncommon to have official advertisements placed in medical 
schools and journals for openings at new AIDS clinics, interviews for these jobs 
conducted, and then no actions taken to actually staff the positions advertised 
and interviewed for. Drug shipments may also be delayed either through red-
tape or slowness in purchasing. The certification procedure for clinics can be 
made long and arbitrary. Most importantly, both the national ANC government 
can effectively cut health spending, making it harder to do anything associated 
with the rollout at the provincial level. In 6 of the 9 provinces, the provincial 
budget on HIV/AIDS is over 80% funded by the conditional grants from the 
national government (notably, these provinces are ANC-strongholds).9 If the 
government wishes to limit enrollment in the programme, there are a range of 
means by which it can accomplish this. 
Social, Political and Epidemiological History 
South Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic had its beginnings in the diagnosis of HIV 
among white gay men in 1982, but little public health work was done on the 
disease until an AIDS Advisory group was appointed in 1985.10 The group 
                                                 
9 IDASA Budget Brief No. 156 
10 Avert.org, an AIDS charity. 
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remained in a minor advisory capacity and few policies were implemented until 
national antenatal clinic testing was established in 1990. That year a national 
antenatal prevalence rate of 0.8%, indicating that to some extent the disease was 
no longer being exclusively carried by gay men, but by members of the general 
population.11 South Africa with its long borders and extensive highways is 
home to a large trucking network that allowed the disease to travel over large 
areas through the transient sexual relationships that characterise mobile 
professions.12 Subgroups such as truckers, soldiers who contracted the disease 
abroad, and sex workers all contributed to the explosive growth of the disease 
over the next twelve years leading to a 2002 national antenatal prevalence of 
26.5%.13 As Barnett and Whiteside (2002) have observed, the southern African 
disease environment naturally leaned towards transforming HIV/AIDS from a 
concentrated epidemic (focused mainly on high-risk subpopulations like those 
mentioned above) to a generalised one in which heterosexual contact became 
the primary means of infection, leading to the infection of normally low-risk 
individuals.14 The South African epidemic could be characterized as one that 
burgeoned from at-risk populations to that general public, with prevalence 
reaching enormous levels by the end of the millennium. 
During this time, however, there were few efforts made to address the growing 
epidemic. In 1992, the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (NACOSA) 
was assembled to develop a comprehensive national strategy for dealing with 
the AIDS problem (at this point antenatal prevalence was 2.8%).15 The plan, 
however, was not presented until 1994 and was condemned by international 
public health professionals for being poorly conceived and difficult to execute. 
Unfortunately, public health officials from international organisations such 
USAID and the WHO were still more focused on and experienced dealing with 
“traditional” threats such as malaria, tuberculosis and cholera.16 As a result, 
little serious pressure was put on the South African government from the 
international community to address the epidemic. When Al Gore appealed to the 
South Africa government to address AIDS more seriously during 1996-1998, 
more time was spent discussing whether parallel licensing of drugs would be an 
acceptable part of the plan of action, than developing any real plan of action.17 
Since there was little demand on the part of the international community for a 
                                                 
11 http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2003/june/aids.htm, article by Alan Whiteside. 
12 South Africa has 73 500 kms of paved highway and 289 000 kms of unpaved highway. 
Taken from the CIA World Factbook.  For more information read: 
http://www.kit.nl/frameset.asp?/ils/exchange_content/html/2003-2-south-africa.asp&frnr=1& 
13 Heinecken (2001)  
14 Barnett and Whiteside (2002), pgs 98-124 
15 Avert. Org  
16 Behrman (2004) 
17 Behrman 2004: 142-148 
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serious and concerted South African strategy to combat HIV/AIDS, many of the 
approaches taken to satisfy this audience tended to be symbolic and cheap. As a 
result, debacles such as that of the Sarafina II national play became 
commonplace. Sarafina II was a theatrical production intended to disseminate 
awareness yet plagued by medical inaccuracies, overspending and corruption, 
leading to its eventual cancellation by the European Union, who funded the 
project. This failed project was emblematic of the government’s approach to the 
problem.18 
Over this time, though, there was little interest on the part of the general 
populace for more aggressive HIV/AIDS policies. As late as 2001, HIV/AIDS 
was mentioned far less than job creation, crime, housing and education as a 
serious national problem. One study found evidence that individual-level 
demand for effective policies correlated with personal exposure to deaths.19 
Given that the disease can lie dormant for upwards of 10 years in some cases, 
this accounts for the lack of public discourse on HIV/AIDS during the 1990s.20 
Even by 2001, only 16% of South Africans had known someone who had died 
of HIV/AIDS.21 As more South Africans were infected, ANC politicians faced 
no serious domestic (or international) demands for stronger HIV/AIDS policies 
allowing the party to establish hegemony over both national and provincial 
South African politics. In sum, it is fair to conclude that the 1990s were 
characterised by a lack of demand on the part of South Africans in the aftermath 
of apartheid, with the issues of inequality, education, crime and poverty taking 
precedence. Additionally, there were considerable failures on the part of the 
international community to bring pressure to bear on the South African 
government. 
In the 5 years that followed this decade of inactivity things would change 
dramatically. In 2000, Thabo Mbeki, the president following Nelson Mandela, 
declared at the International AIDS conference that AIDS was caused by poverty 
and a conspiracy on the part of wealth nations, and that the drugs available to 
treat the disease were lethally toxic.22 Mbeki also defended a small group of 
“AIDS dissidents” who argued that some AIDS treatment drugs actually caused 
HIV/AIDS. Medical and public health professionals domestically and 
internationally reacted with outrage, and Mbeki was widely excoriated for his 
views. The incident garnered worldwide notoriety and sparked serious fears that 
                                                 
18 Nattrass (2004), pg 45 
19 Whiteside et al. (2002) 
20 Hunter (2003), pgs 17-36 
21 Whiteside et al. (2002) 
22 To read the controversial letter by Mbeki go to http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/mbeki.shtml. 
Behrman 2004 provides an excellent discussion of the crisis and international reaction (201-
206). 
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the South African government would do nothing to address its crisis. As a 
result, international pressures on Mbeki grew enormously, with demands for an 
effective South African HIV/AIDS policy that focused not only on treatment 
but on the provision of treatment. 
At the same time, agitations by domestic groups increased exponentially. The 
most widely recognised domestic group, the Treatment Action Committee 
(TAC), began a widely publicised campaign accusing the health ministry of 
murder for not providing ARVs for infected, impoverished South Africans.23 
The group was heavily staffed by traditional ANC-supporting black Africans 
and well-funded and organised, making it allegations seem credible.24 The TAC 
is widely credited with forcing the creation Mother to Child Prevention 
Treatment Programme, organised to prevent transmission of the disease from 
pregnant mothers to their infants. The programme was ordered by the South 
African supreme court following a fierce legal battle between the TAC and the 
government, yet was only effectively implemented in 3 provinces (Western 
Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng) in its first year of existence. Nicoli Nattrass 
has blamed this failure on a lack of political will at the national level, with far-
reaching implications for those provinces governed by the ANC, effectively 
tying them to the decisions made by the Mbeki government.25 Of the provinces 
that did implement the programme successfully, two were not ruled by the 
African National Congress (ANC) at the time and Gauteng, while an ANC-led 
province, demonstrated lower levels of ANC support in the 1999 elections than 
most other provinces. 
The enormous business costs of HIV/AIDS were becoming better recognised by 
the private sector, with more and more businesses moving to provide insurance 
to their employees to prevent turnover from sickness and death.26 Government 
bureaucracies, especially the military, also began to note increased attrition 
among employees their ranks and pressured the government to engage the 
problem before it reached crisis proportions.27  
Recent research using the Afrobarometer survey has found that there was a 
marked rise in the number of respondents who listed HIV/AIDS as an important 
                                                 
23 www.tac.org.za has more information. 
24 In 2003, the group was awarded the Nelson Mandela prize, indicating that they are indeed 
accepted to some extent. From the award’s website: “TAC is the first organisation to receive 
the Award (recipients are usually individuals) in recognition of TAC's effectiveness in 
mobilising a broad public coalition in support of its goals.” 
http://www.kff.org/southafrica/20000829a-index.cfm 
25 Nattrass (2002), pgs 66-67 




funding priority for the government from 2002 to 2004 from 40% to 56%.28 
Additional public opinion work by the Markinor firm has complemented these 
results with evidence that support for the ANC’s HIV/AIDS policy has 
decreased substantially in 2003, prior to the election (see Graph 1). While it is 
beyond the scope of the paper to account for this change in opinion, it is likely 
that the combination of NGO campaigning, international pressures and 
individual experiences with family and friend deaths from AIDS contributed to 
this change in public opinion. 
Resistance to the implementation of more aggressive AIDS-treatment policies 
has been a hallmark of the Mbeki administration. Both the president and his 
secretary of health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, have repeatedly emphasised 
the dangers of ARVs, the importance of other traditional approaches to treating 
AIDS and the potentially ruinous costs of providing such medications. Why 
Mbeki and others in the ANC resisted ARVs and tougher action in the face of 
HIV/AIDS is a difficult question to answer. I will avoid speculation on this 
issue since it may simply be that he and others within the ANC are ideologically 
opposed to aggressive HIV/AIDS policies.   
Graph 1: Public Opinion and HIV/AIDS 
 
Source: Markinor Firm. 
Faced with stiff criticism from political opponents and legal threats from the 
TAC and its allies, it is widely speculated that Mbeki’s cabinet in late 2003 took 
the rare step of overruling the president on the issue of wide-scale, free 
                                                 
28 Afrobarometer Briefing Paper 14 
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provision of ARVs.29 This is impossible to verify, given that the minutes of such 
proceedings are kept secret, but shortly after this meeting it was announced that 
a rollout of the drugs would be commenced in 2004, with the earlier Western 
Cape provision being incorporated into this larger plan. As the Markinor data 
shows, the announcement of the plan quieted fears among blacks and Indians, 
the ANC’s key constituencies for the election. This allowed the party to win an 
even larger majority national vote-share than it held previously and placing it in 
control of 8 of the 9 provincial governments. Whites and coloureds, to a lesser 
extent, remained strongly critical of the ANC’s policies. These gains came even 
as most South Africans saw HIV/AIDS as a responsibility for the national 
government, with 61% reporting that the national government should be 
responsible for HIV/AIDS policy, versus 25% and 14% respectively saying that 
the provincial or municipal governments should be responsible.30 
In the months following the election, the rollout was repeatedly delayed through 
personnel shortages and bureaucratic red-tape contributing. The TAC in its first 
evaluation found that the rollout was not proceeding effectively in most areas, 
with clinics in the provinces of Mpumalanga and Limpopo, both ANC 
strongholds, faring far worse than the rest of the country.31 An analysis of the 
ARV rollout by Nicoli Nattrass has found that the rollout continues to fall far 
short even of the government’s announced goals (see Graph 2).32 The plan, 
through additional generous funding by PEPFAR and other AIDS-related 
programmes, has rapidly outpaced other sources of ARVs. The total public 
sector provision is roughly 57.7% of all ARV receivers. Private care through 
insurance, work-related and self-funded modes of treatment amounts to roughly 
36.7% of the total number of treated patients. Not-for-profit provision remains 
at only 5.5% of all the treated, meaning that most economically disadvantaged 
South Africans with AIDS will almost certainly have to rely on publicly 
distributed ARVs. 
While the history of HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa seems to confirm the 
importance of politics and political considerations in the actions taken by 
successive ANC governments, it does not allow us to distinguish among the 
theories I detailed earlier. Using statistical methods to disentangle these various 
effects will be the focus of the next section. 
 
                                                 
29 The South African cabinet is one of the few in the world that can, in private meetings, 
overrule the president. 
30 Markinor poll 
31 “Let Them Eat Cake – A Short Assessment of Provision Treatment and Care 18 Months 
After the Adoption of the Operational Plan” 
32 Nattrass (2006) 
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Methods and Data 
To test the above theories, I have collected a dataset covering the first 6 months 
of the ARV rollout of South Africa. In analysing this data, I employ several 
regression approaches to deal with two outlier districts: the Cape Town and 
Johannesburg metropolitan areas are theoretically important, but outliers far out 
in the tails of the distributions for population, income, health infrastructure, and 
the distribution of drugs. Furthermore, they have lower levels of support for the 
ANC. If these two districts were simply put into a regression, they would come 
to drive the results of the regression. I use two techniques to deal with their 
impact. I estimate regressions using robust least squares estimation (RLS) to 
produce coefficient estimates that are less heavily driven by the outliers. 33 I also 
take the initial distribution of AIDS-drugs in the first month of the programme 
as a control for the initial advantages of Cape Town and Johannesburg. The 
latter technique also manages to better account for variation in infrastructure 
among the provinces since any gains between commencement and the later 
month are due solely to government investiture. 
                                                 
33 Robust regression is a widely researched topic in statistics. For important works see Huber 
(2003) and Hampel et al. (2005). I base my practice on the recommendations of Venables and 
Ripley (2002), 156-163.  
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Dependent Variable34 
OCT: The dependent variable I use is district-level observations of patients 
enrolled (and therefore drugs distributed) in the fourth month (October, 2004) of 
rollout plan by district. The data come from reporting by each of the provincial 
health ministries in response to a TAC-led lawsuit against the government to 
reveal the number of patients on treatment. I use the fourth month for several 
reasons. First, it takes at least several months for any distributional plan to begin 
to function adequately. The graph of the actual rate of the rollout versus the 
expected rate from ASSA demonstrates this convincingly (see graph 2). Second, 
since the Western Cape had an earlier start than the other provinces, by using a 
later month, I am able to allow for more convergence in distribution by the 
other provinces. 
Control Variables 
HIVAIDS: Controlling for the need for the drugs in a given province is 
important and entails knowing the number of individuals who need these drugs. 
This exact number of individuals who have a white blood-cell count low enough 
to require the drugs is unavailable since the monitoring of HIV/AIDS is a 
difficult task. I proxy for this by using reported 2004 antenatal clinic HIV/AIDS 
prevalence at the district level as reported by the Health Systems Trust Health 
Barometer 2004. 
IMMUN: Measuring the capacity of a given district to deliver the drugs depends 
heavily on the ability of a given province to be able to provide service-intensive 
medical care. One such measure of this is the child immunisation rate, since the 
medical requirements for immunising a child are not unlike those required for 
HIV/AIDS (both require monitoring, check-ups and laboratory work). I 
gathered this variable from the Health Systems Trust Health Barometer 2004. 
POP: Many of the variables of interest in this study are dependent on the 
magnitude of a particular population within a province. I include population, as 
coded from the 2001 Census to control for differences in population size 
between provinces. 
                                                 
34 Two districts were merged in the report from which I coded the dependent variable. I was 
also required to drop an additional three because they did not contain some measures on one 
of the three control variables. These absences do not seem to be systematic and so I do not 
regard them as a problem for my analysis. 
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JUL: This is the initial level of distribution in the rollout, coded similarly to 
OCT. I use it as a control for the initial advantages of Cape Town and 
Johannesburg 
Independent Variables 
ANCVOTE: If there is evidence of a supply-side dynamic, then we should 
expect that great ANC-support, ceteris paribus, leads to greater number of 
ARVs being distributed. This returns to the issue of the ANC’s original pre-
election promise to distribute these drugs effectively to those who need them 
most. It is important to consider not only vote-share, but the numbers of voters 
in a PR system, so I control for population. I used the ANC vote-share for each 
district in the 2004 South African national elections for this variable, coded 
from the South African Elections monitor. 
DEMAND: In order to measure the demand among voters in a district for 
ARVs, I recoded survey data from the 2002 South African Afrobarometer 
survey from the municipal to the district level using maps. If a demand driven 
dynamic is at work in the distribution of ARVs, then higher demand should 
correlate with more ARV distribution. I then constructed a proportion, for each 
district, of respondents who listed HIV/AIDS as one of their top three concerns 
for the nation.  
INCOME: It may be that those with higher income desire the drugs more 
because wealthier citizens are likely to have fewer day-to-day concerns than 
poorer citizens. They do not have to divide their pressures on their politicians 
among multiple issues. They may also treat the problem of ARV distribution as 
something like a post-materialist policy, a matter of good governance, and have 
the financial capacities to monitor its distribution. A positive coefficient on 
INCOME can be taken as evidence in favor of demand as a factor in the 
distribution of these drugs. I measure income by the proportion of individuals in 
a district who earned above the mean income for South Africa, using 2001 
Census data.  
RURAL: This is a measure that seeks to account for the differences between 
rural and urban districts, since rural districts are less likely to be able to organise 
to pressure the government for more drugs (controlling for differences in 
medical services and infrastructure). A significant and rural coefficient for 
RURAL, can be interpreted as an indication of a demand driven dynamic (since 
I am already controlling for infrastructure). The variable is coded from the 
Afrobarometer survey, in which respondents were identified as being from an 
urban (coded as 1) and rural (coded as 2). I averaged these identifications over 
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each district to give a rough measure of how rural a district is. The measure 
ranges from 1 (very urban) to 2 (very rural). 
COLORED/INDIAN/WHITE: Coloreds are an important ethnic swing group in 
western South Africa, since they are not traditional ANC supporters, and hence 
the presence of colored voters may indicate voters whose support can be bought 
with better drug programmes by the ANC. Particularly since they are more 
critical of the government’s HIV/AIDS policy. Indians follow a different logic 
as a group. They are heavily concentrated in the KwaZulu-Natal region and are 
an important and loyal constituency for the ANC there. They also tend to be less 
critical of the ANC’s HIV/AIDS policies. Whites, on the other hand, 
traditionally vote against the ANC. They also tend to be wealthier and more 
critical of the government’s HIV/AIDS policies. Taking these observations 
together, we may conclude that positive and significant coefficients on 
COLORED and WHITE are an indication of demand-centered policies. A 
positive coefficient on the INDIAN variable is evidence, on the other hand for 
supply driven policies. The three variables are coded from the 2001 National 
Census and measure the size of each group relative to total population in each 
district. 
ELF: This variable is an ethnic fractionalisation index constructed from the 
2001 Census data. I include it to test for similar mechanisms to those found by 
Alesina et al. and Easterly and Levine.  
Hypotheses 
Table 2 reports the different independent variables and links them to two of the 
broader theories I outlined in the previous section. If a variable is significant at 
the 5% level or less, then the sign of its coefficient can be constituted as 
evidence for one of the theories. The magnitude of the coefficient relative to 
others in the regression will also be important indication of how much support 
the theory has from the evidence. If no independent variables are significant, 
then it is likely that it is infrastructure that has the strongest effect on how 
receives these drugs. 
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Table 2: Variable Predictions 
Variable Theory 
Expected Sign if Theory 
Accurate 
ANCVOTE Supply Side negative 
DEMAND Demand Side positive 
INCOME Demand Side positive 
RURAL Demand Side negative 
COLORED Demand Side positive 
WHITE Demand Side positive 
INDIAN Supply Side/Demand Side positive/negative 
Results 
Table 3 presents the results of my analysis. Model 0 is the baseline regression, 
which uses only the control variables. Surprisingly, only POP has a significant 
coefficient at conventional levels, indicating that more populous districts are 
more likely to be receiving drugs. Both IMMUN and HIVAIDS have positive 
coefficients, nonetheless, which fit with expectations prior to the tests.35 Model 
1 adds the variable ANCVOTE to the basic model. The sign on the coefficient 
is large and negative, which fits with the interpretation that the ANC seeks to 
distribute ARVs in regions where its vote share is not assured. ANCVOTE’s 
coefficient has a large t-value, but is not significant at conventional levels 
leaving us unable to reject the hypothesis that ANC vote-share has no impact of 
ARV distribution. Model 2 adds DEMAND to the basic model, though the 
coefficient is clearly not significant. Model 3 puts INCOME in the basic model, 
which returns a relatively strong and very significant effect. The presence of a 
higher proportion of wealthier individuals in a given district leads to a greater 
distribution of ARVs in that district. This fits well with the demand-side process 
I described above. The fourth model tests the effect of the RURAL. The result is 
a negative coefficient which is statistically significant. Like INCOME, RURAL 
is a useful measure of demand for the drug since protests and monitoring of the 
rollout is likely to be much harder in rural districts.  
Models 5, 6 and 7 test the ethnic variables. WHITE and COLORED are both 
positive, with nearly identical coefficients, and both are significant, though 
white has a slightly higher t-value. INDIAN is also significant, though its 
coefficient is negative. These three models constitute strong evidence of 
demand-drive dynamic, in which ethnic groups who have been critical of the 
                                                 
35 I had to use a slightly different estimation method for Model 0 than the others since the 
algorithm for the maximum likelihood estimate did not converge. I adjusted the breakdown 
point of the model’s estimate to achieve convergence after running comparable models with 
OLS estimate. All other models converged, and were estimated with RLS using a suitably 
modified version maximum likelihood. 
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government’s HIV/AIDS policies receive more drugs. Indians, a traditional 
ANC constituency, are less critical and thus receive fewer drugs. 
Table 3: RLS Estimates  
 
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
-2.3238 
ANCVOTE  (-1.5959)        
0.035 
DEMAND   (-0.7716)       
0.2784 
INCOME    (-6.2989)      
-0.1174 
RURAL     (-3.1578)     
0.1113 
COLORED      (-2.3018)    
0.113 
WHITE       (-3.0042)   
-0.1171 
INDIAN        (-2.2696)  
0.1136 
ELF         (-2.8621) 
0.2169 0.4045 0.4295 0.1659 0.3936 0.4395 0.3672 0.4131 0.4254 
POP (-6.4315) (-10.6126) (-9.656) (-3.8786) (-11.3088) (-11.9912) (-10.2252) (-8.9208) (-11.1774) 
0.0226 0.052 0.0616 -0.0078 0.3936 0.0457 0.0359 -0.0665 0.0475 
IMMUN (-0.6605) (-1.3188) (-1.3814) (-0.2605) (-0.7827) (-1.177) (-1.0013) (-1.612) (-1.2345) 
0.0399 0.0197 0.0238 0.0149 0.006 0.1028 0.0561 0.0665 0.0632 
HIVAIDS (-1.1546) (-0.5018) (-0.527) (-0.5287) (-0.1704) (-2.2304) (-1.5832) (-1.1042) -1.6484 
-0.1952 -0.122 0.035 -0.1406 -0.1092 -0.1131 -0.1268 0.0513 -0.1057 
CONSTANT ( -5.9180) (-3.2720) (-0.7716) (-5.2546) (-3.3239) (-3.1662) (-3.8250) (-1.1042) (-2.9458) 
N 48 48 47 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Adjusted R-
Squared 0.2165 0.4152 0.4013 0.4352 0.4366 0.4386 0.4125 0.3998 0.4101 
Notes:  
All variables (and coefficients) standardised. 
(T-values in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: OCT 
These initial tests reveal strong evidence in favor of demand-type theories, but it 
now become important to test them against one another. Is it ethnic politics that 
drives ARV distribution, the presence of wealthier South Africans, or the 
inability of communities to organise, monitor and protest poor government 
performance? While it is likely to be some combination of all three, by 
comparing each explanation against the others, it is possible to gain some 
leverage on which best determines ARV distribution. 
Table 4 presents some regressions I ran to test the various theories against one 
another. Model 8 continues to use robust least-squares estimation, with 
INCOME, RURAL, COLORED, WHITE and INDIAN added to the control 
variables. In this regression, only INCOME and INDIAN remain significant. 
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The INCOME coefficient remains positive and has the largest magnitude. The 
INDIAN coefficient stays negative, though its effect is relatively small. Recall 
that the motivation for using RLS was the concern that the outliers of Cape 
Town and Johannesburg would have too much influence over the regression 
results. In Models 9 and 10, I will make sure that the results are not driven by 
either city, despite the use of robust regression. Model 9 uses ordinary least-
squares estimation, but uses a dummy variable (CPTJOB DUMMY) to isolate 
the effects of Cape Town and Johannesburg on the other variables.36 
Unsurprisingly, the enormous effects of Cape Town and Johannesburg are 
largely driving the regression, leaving only the control variable POP significant 
at conventional levels. INCOME, though, comes very close to being significant 
at the 5% level, with a t-value of roughly 1.73 (versus 1.96 for 5% significance).  
Model 10 also employs OLS, though it estimates the regression on reduced 
sample in which Cape Town and Johannesburg are dropped. Only INCOME, 
among the explanatory variables, remains significant, and its effect grows 
without Cape Town or Johannesburg.  
I ran a final battery of tests to confirm my results. These regressions, shown in 
table 5, use the initial distribution of drugs (JUL) as a control for the later 
distribution (OCT). Model 12 is the baseline model. JUL, POP and HIVAIDS 
are all significant with positive coefficients. These coefficients remain this way 
in all the other models (except for model 15, where POP fails to be significant). 
Models 13 – 20 introduce the various independent predictors, with only 
RURAL and INCOME producing significant results. INCOME has a strongly 
positive effect, while the effect of RURAL is weakly positive. Model 21 
compares all the variables together, with only JUL and INCOME remaining 
significant. This lends added confidence to the assertion that it the greater 
presence of middle- and high-income citizens that drives the distribution of 
ARVs in South Africa. 
                                                 
36 The adjusted R-squared is increased considerably since the normal OLS estimation 
minimizes the sum-of-squares. In the robust regressions, the adjusted R-squared is much 
smaller since the regression specifically does not account for the maximum amount of 
variance among the dependent variable since doing so would overvalue the effects of outliers. 
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Table 4: RLS and OLS Estimates  
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Variable (RLS and full data) (OLS and full data) (OLS and reduced data) 
0.2701 0.1355 0.3521 
INCOME (-3.5838) (-1.788) (-1.711) 
-0.0522 -0.0648 0.06381 
RURAL ( -1.1647) (-1.462) (-0.522) 
0.1072 0.1064 0.1234 
COLORED (-1.3731) (-1.378) (-0.579) 
-0.0205 0.0506 -0.3665 
WHITE (-0.2872) (-0.672) (-1.88) 
-0.0673 -0.038 -0.337 
INDIAN (-1.3172) (-0.706) (-2.416) 
-0.0866 -0.1178 0.2905 
ELF (-0.8705) (-1.157) (-1.069) 
3.6622 
CPTJOB DUMMY  (-15.89)  
0.2155 0.2102 0.6799 
POP (-3.3344) (-2.985) (-3.853) 
-0.0222 -0.0185 0.1064 
IMMUN (-0.6256) (-0.514) (-1.1) 
0.0561 0.06443 0.7534 
HIVAIDS (-1.116) (-1.296) (-0.549) 
-0.1394 -0.1526 0 
CONSTANT (-4.6769) (-4.920) (0) 
N 48 48 46 
Adjusted R-
Squared 0.3798 0.9583 0.682 
Notes 
All variables (and coefficients) standardised. 
(T-values in parentheses)  
Dependent Variables: OCT and OCT without Cape Town and Johannesburg 
 
Table 5: OLS Estimates  
Variable Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
-0.01201 0.000453 
ANCVOTE  (-0.434)        0.014 
0.007588 -0.01713 
DEMAND   (0.258)       (-0.428) 
0.1408 0.204 
INCOME    (3.536)      (3.314) 
0.05532 -0.0405 
RURAL     (-1.911)     (-0.892) 
0.01747 0.06812 
COLORED      (0.481)    (0.957) 
0.03198 -0.03660 
WHITE       (1.073)   (-0.544) 
-0.003551 0.04958 
INDIAN        (-0.099)  (1.009) 
0.01714 -0.1069 
ELF         (0.579) (-1.187) 
0.9047 0.9013 0.9055 0.8675 0.8930 0.9007 0.8985 0.9034 0.9002 0.8834 
JUL (22.321) (21.613) (21.666) (23.124) (22.427) (21.572) (21.983) (20.956) (21.644) (19.144) 
0.1234 0.126 0.1258 0.0499 0.182 1.273 0.1177 0.1259 0.1223 -0.006544 
POP (3.152) (3.152) (3.019) (1.091) (3.104) (3.157) (2.985) (2.693) (3.095) (-0.101) 
-1.012 -0.0163 -0.01388 -0.03652 -0.02663 -0.1335 -0.1712 0.009777 -0.01324 -0.04925 
IMMUN (-0.350) (-0.395) (-0.450) (-1.364) (-0.906) (-0.445) (-0.578) (-0.331) (-0.446) (-1.624) 
0.08581 0.08377 0.08728 0.07007 0.07327 0.09478 0.0905 0.08699 0.08812 (0.05806) 
HIVAIDS (3.033) (2.893) (2.866) (2.745) (2.595) (2.779) (3.166) (2.807) (3.060) (1.338) 
0 0 -0.001465 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001149 
CONSTANT (0) (0) (-0.054) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (-0.047) 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9674 0.9668 0.9667 0.9743 0.9693 0.9668 0.9675 0.9667 0.9669 0.9728 
Notes 
All variables (and coefficients) standardised. 
(T-values in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: OCT 
An Informational Explanation 
With the statistical results pointing in the direction of a demand-driven pattern 
to ARV distribution, it is now time to turn to incorporating theory and the 
qualitative record into an explanation of why there is such a pattern of ARV 
distribution in South Africa. The rollout plan was announced by the ANC prior 
to the 2004 elections in response to growing disenchantment with their 
HIV/AIDS policies, and was likely “forced” on Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang 
by other cabinet ministers. Since the commencement of the plan, it is very 
unlikely that either Mbeki or his supporters within the ANC have shifted their 
stance on ARVs. Though they do not speak out directly against the plan, ARVs 
are infrequently mentioned in government announcements about HIV/AIDS, 
except in relation to the rollout and how well it is proceeding. 
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly argue that different groups have different 
preferences over public goods. While this point may be unlikely with many 
types of goods (for example, every groups desires better schools, roads, police 
and so on), it may well be that particular groups in some districts are better able 
to monitor whether the government is intentionally failing to live up to its 
responsibilities. This turns the idea of politicians monitoring citizens proposed 
by Brusco et al. on its head, with citizens monitoring the government’s 
performance. The idea is not a new one, especially in the African context. 
Robert Bates (1984) argued that many African states had their agricultural 
policies driven by urban constituencies more capable of organising to pressure 
the government. In the case of ARVs, those individuals with the time and 
resources necessary to monitor the government’s performance are likely to be 
middle-class or wealthier. They are able to fund and participate in NGOs such 
as TAC, attend protests and support legal action against the government. Poor 
South Africans are less likely to have the resources to support action against the 
government and will be less informed as to why the programme is such a failure 
in their districts.  
Wealthier South Africans will also be able to convey information gathered 
about the government’s (in)action to other districts through protests, legal 
pressures and the media coverage that accompanies both. Why should the 
government care about protests and the negative information they convey? 
There are two important reasons. The first is that South Africa has paid 
considerable reputation costs internationally as a result of its inaction. Stephen 
Lewis (2006), the UN special envoy on HIV/AIDS has been publicly critical of 
the ANC’s government on its inaction. Since large portions of the government’s 
HIV/AIDS and development programmes are funded by other governments and 
international organisations, appearing “soft” on AIDS could carry serious 
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consequences, with such funding being cut or even rescinded. On the domestic 
front, HIV/AIDS is growing as an important electoral issue. More and more 
citizens are coming to regard HIV/AIDS policies as comparably important with 
those of the economy, crime and education. A failure to take HIV/AIDS 
seriously could lead serious electoral vulnerability on the part of the ANC in 
later elections, as NGOs can keep issues that might otherwise be forgotten at the 
front of voters’ minds. 
We can thus read the ANC-government’s behavior as being one of delivering 
drugs to those districts in which citizens who are best able to gather information 
about the government’s success and communicate this information to citizens in 
other districts. Those districts populated by citizens who are less able to monitor 
and protest against the government are short-changed because much of the 
government has a strong ideological interest in not promoting these drugs. In 
some sense, the ANC is attempting finding a compromise between its 
ideological leanings and the pressures of satisfying electoral constituencies. It is 
delivering an ARV programme “on the cheap”: distributing the drugs widely 
only in those constituencies in which not doing so would lead to political costs. 
It is important to note that these may not be districts with higher need or 
demand for these drugs, as the statistical insignificance of my income and need 
variables indicates.37 Those districts that receive more drugs only need to 
possess a large enough proportion of sufficiently wealthy citizens to support the 
activities of NGOs who can monitor and punish the government for ineffective 
actions. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented an analysis of the initial stages of the South 
African ARV rollout. I find evidence that the distribution of drugs is strongly 
influenced by political considerations; namely, that the government seeks to 
minimize the numbers of drugs it distributes without incurring political costs. 
The ANC achieves this by distributing drugs effectively in those areas in which 
citizens are able to monitor the programme and disseminate information about 
distribution widely, and under-distributing in those regions in which citizens 
cannot monitor the government or disseminate information effectively. 
Over the long-term, such a policy seems unsustainable because policy attitudes 
towards HIV/AIDS tend to be set by personal experiences of illness and death. 
As ARVs consistently fail to be distributed and more deaths occur, citizens will 
                                                 
37 In fact, both INCOME and DEMAND only weakly correlate with HIVAIDS, each having 
an absolute correlation of under 0.25. 
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start to ask the government some hard questions. Preliminary data show that 
there is some convergence between regions, though the lack of solid empirical 
data on the programme makes it very difficult to analyse what the precise trends 
are. 
The results of this study, though, suggest two clear policy recommendations. 
The first is that international organisations and other governments make their 
funding to South Africa (and other African governments) conditional on 
maintaining widely available and externally monitored data about their 
programmes, especially who and where the recipients are of ARVs and other 
goods and services. Such publicly available data will make it far more difficult 
for a government to falsely suggest that it has an effective and broad ARV 
programme when it does not by making monitoring of such activitiess and the 
dissemination of information a less costly activity for individuals in all districts. 
The second is that NGOs, both African and international, should make efforts to 
organise individuals in both lower-income and rural districts. They should also 
make substantial efforts to secure media coverage on protests in such areas, as 
such negative attention is likely to induce the political costs necessary to force 
governments to take action. 
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Appendix 
Appendix table: Correlations among Variables: 
 
 
Appendix graph: Scatterplot Matrix of Variables 
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 OCT POP IMMUN HIVAIDS ANCVOTE DEMAND INCOME RURAL COLORED WHITE INDIAN 
OCT 1           
POP 0.68388 1          
IMMUN -0.06755 -0.21887 1         
HIVAIDS 0.29077 0.26020 -0.17966 1        
ANCVOTE -0.11880 0.08397 -0.13380 -0.11690 1       
DEMAND -0.1054 -0.2866 0.22212 0.06187 0.34078 1      
INCOME 0.78277 0.59905 0.13026 0.18587 -0.02837 -0.21631 1     
RURAL -0.42072 -0.12845 -0.26018 -0.18189 0.05767 -0.26619 -0.57991 1    
COLORED -0.18005 -0.31874 0.32178 -0.59440 -0.21511 -0.16000 0.01791 -0.05721 1   
WHITE 0.36974 0.13218 0.24246 -0.16835 -0.02058 -0.36172 0.6422 -0.54383 0.49272 1  
INDIAN 0.27070 0.5433 -0.11076 0.46974 -0.20632 -0.09008 0.24690 -0.14700 -0.13117 0.01237 1 
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